Southeast Asia Global Relations Outlook Part 2: The ASEAN-6

In this second part of our short series analyzing Southeast Asia’s Global Relations Outlook for 2025, we provide an in-depth look into the political and economic trajectories and key issues facing the ASEAN-6 countries this year: Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore. Navigating geopolitical tensions and trade challenges while maintaining domestic political stability emerges as a key theme for 2025 in most countries.
Malaysia
Greater Political Stability
Malaysia enters 2025 with far greater political stability compared to the last several years, a period characterized by frequent changes of government and political infighting. Since forming his unity government in 2022, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has managed to consolidate his position and fend off threats from the Islamist-leaning opposition coalition Perikatan Nasional (PN), the latter having become increasingly fractured and beset by defections over the past year.
Nevertheless, Anwar’s government has received criticism from civil society and activists, who accuse him of breaking campaign pledges to review and repeal laws restricting free speech and dissent. Instead, the government has been accused of using these laws to suppress criticism and appease conservative factions. Planned regulations of social media have also engendered a backlash due to fears that they may be used to control online discourse. Further, the government’s credibility in tackling corruption has been questioned, with many accusing the government of only targeting opposition figures.
Fostering Foreign Investment
Such political stability will allow PM Anwar greater leeway to implement his economic reform agenda, which focuses on enhancing Malaysia’s attractiveness to foreign investors through policies of fiscal consolidation. Malaysia’s 2025 Budget, unveiled in October, focuses on broadening the tax base and lowering the fiscal deficit to 3.8% of GDP, down from 4.3% in 2024. The Malaysian government has targeted growth of between 4.5% to 5.5% in 2025, compared to a revised range of 4.8% to 5.3% in 2024. [1]
A key measure introduced in the 2025 Budget was the removal of blanket subsidies for RON95 petrol, which followed the earlier removal of diesel subsidies in June. Other measures are focused on broadening the tax base, such as reviewing the Sales and Services Tax (SST) alongside introducing a new progressive tax on dividend income over MYR 100,000 (USD 22,840) for private investors. [2]
Under Anwar’s premiership, Malaysia has emerged as a key beneficiary of the ongoing reshoring of China-based manufacturing and operations. Over the past year, Malaysia has managed to attract several high-value investments, with global tech firms such as Google and Microsoft having committed billions of dollars. Malaysia has particularly emerged as an attractive destination for data centers and backend semiconductor fabrication, drawn to the country’s political stability, adequate infrastructure, and pro-investment environment.
The planned Johor-Singapore Special Economic Zone (JS-SEZ), which aims for the free movement of goods and people between the southern state of Johor and Singapore, is expected to further raise Malaysia’s attractiveness as an investment destination— particularly for Singaporean firms looking to ‘internationalize’ closer to home— although investors have warned of persistent challenges including congested border crossings and lengthy permit processes.
Balancing China and the United States
Economic pragmatism is expected to remain the cornerstone of Malaysia’s relationship with China. Both parties would mark the fiftieth anniversary of diplomatic relations in 2024, with Chinese Premier Li Qiang visiting Malaysia in June followed by a visit from Malaysia’s King Sultan Ibrahim Iskandar to China in September, where he met Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li. During Premier Li’s visit, both countries signed a new five-year agreement for economic and trade cooperation, signaling a mutual desire to deepen economic relations. While Malaysia is a claimant state to the South China Sea, it generally seeks to separate the dispute from its crucial economic relationship with China.
Future ties with the US, on the other hand, will be greatly shaped by the second Trump administration’s tariff policies and their impact on Malaysian exports. Although China remains Malaysia’s largest trading partner, the US market is arguably more crucial, as Malaysia is a net exporter to the US while it is a net importer from China. Trump’s proposed tariffs could significantly affect Malaysia’s electrical and electronics (E&E) exports to the US, including its exports of microchips and semiconductors. At the same time, Malaysia may also continue to benefit from more firms reshoring their China-based operations to Malaysia.
Vietnam
Political Upheaval to Abate Somewhat
The upheaval that characterized Vietnamese politics over the last two years is expected to abate somewhat in 2025, following the election of former Minister of Public Security To Lam to the position of general secretary in August 2024. Prior to Lam’s election, Vietnam had seen frequent leadership changes due to the ongoing ‘Blazing Furnace’ anti-corruption campaign. Introduced by former General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, this campaign saw over 4,400 individuals indicted for corruption-related charges. Among those targeted included members of the Politburo, with two presidents, two deputy prime ministers, and a National Assembly chairman removed from their positions. As the former head of public security, Lam oversaw the campaign, which critics alleged he weaponized to remove rivals in succeeding Trong as the next general secretary.
The ’Blazing Furnace’ has inadvertently caused paralysis within the country’s bureaucracy, disrupting Vietnam’s larger business environment. Decision making and official approvals for projects have stalled, being hampered by an overly cautious approach adopted by officials who fear being investigated for corruption. Analysts argue that this has caused Vietnam’s economy to underperform expectations in recent years.
For a period after August, Lam simultaneously held the position of general secretary and president, raising concerns about a potential consolidation of power. In October, Vietnam’s parliament voted in 67-year-old Army General Luong Cuong as president, succeeding Lam. This may have been part of a power-sharing compromise reached with Lam within the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). Cuong’s election suggests more stability in Vietnam’s political system in the near-to-medium term. It has been suggested that Lam’s leadership style is less ideological and more pragmatic compared to Trong, with expectations of more focus on economic development and foreign investments. Indeed, Lam had previously called for technology-led ‘high quality’ growth for Vietnam.
Bureaucratic Paralysis May Continue
However, Lam’s call for Blazing Furnace to continue suggests that the current paralysis affecting Vietnam’s bureaucracy may continue for the time being. As the CPV approaches its next National Congress in 2026, we may see a return to political turbulence as factions within the party begin jockeying for key positions. The 14th National Congress in 2026 will see all top positions within the CPV up for grabs as part of a regular five-year reorganization of political leadership.
Separately, Vietnam is finalizing one of its most significant reforms to the government and political apparatus in recent history, which includes the merger and consolidation of several ministries and agencies at both the national and sub-national levels. With leadership and organizational reform affecting most government institutions, temporary bureaucratic halt might be expected, although a more streamlined and efficient government and bureaucratic structure can be expected after the reform period concludes.
More Authoritarian Vietnam
Given Lam’s background in the security sector, concerns have been raised that his ascent to the position of general secretary may signal a shift towards a more authoritarian system. Indeed, the Politburo is dominated by figures from the Ministry of Public Security, where Lam retains significant influence, while the military forms the second-largest bloc. During Lam’s time at the Ministry of Public Security, activists and civil society were targeted, while restrictions were placed on foreign NGOs. A more repressive Vietnam may prove challenging to future ties with Western powers.
Bamboo Diplomacy to Continue
Vietnam is expected to continue with its long-standing policy of ‘bamboo diplomacy’, characterized by flexibility and maintaining equidistance between China and the US. In terms of Hanoi’s relationship with the US, the Trump presidency presents both opportunities and risks for Vietnam. Given Vietnam’s heavy reliance on trade (with exports comprising 85% of its GDP), the country is particularly vulnerable to Trump’s planned tariffs on all global imports to the US. Research by the Economist Intelligence Unit published just before the US presidential elections identified Vietnam as the fourth most vulnerable to changes in US trade policy under a second Trump administration. There are also concerns that Trump may target Vietnam directly due to its growing trade deficit with the United States. During Trump’s first term, he had criticized Vietnam’s trade surplus and had begun the process for initiating sanctions on the country over its alleged currency manipulation. However, Vietnam may also benefit from the shift of manufacturing and exports from China, as it did during the first Trump presidency.
Vietnam’s economic ties with China are expected to remain robust. China is Vietnam’s largest trading partner, while Vietnam is China’s largest trading partner in Southeast Asia. Lam’s new government is expected to continue leveraging these economic ties to bolster his own domestic legitimacy through promoting development. In terms of the South China Sea dispute, Hanoi is expected to continue prioritizing a diplomatic approach vis-a-vis China while also quietly asserting its territorial claims through an expanded military presence within the contested waters.
Thailand
Political Volatility to Continue
2025 is projected to be a challenging year for Thailand, with political volatility and disruption expected to carry over from 2024. Thai politics is currently characterized by an uneasy alliance between the Shinawatra political family and Thailand’s conservative establishment. In August 2024, the Constitutional Court dismissed Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin for an ethics violation, with former Thai premier Thaksin Shinawatra’s daughter Paetongtarn Shinawatra succeeding him as Thailand’s second female prime minister and head of the Pheu Thai-led coalition government.
The long-term prospects of Thailand’s government remain to be seen, given increasing tensions within the coalition (namely between the Shinawatra-dominated Pheu Thai and Bhumjaithai), and between Pheu Thai and the conservative establishment. These tensions are directly attributed to Thaksin Shinawatra’s apparent attempts to consolidate power and influence the government from behind the scenes. Thaksin has visibly played a prominent role in choosing members of the cabinet and directing economic policy.
Paetongtarn’s government is currently facing an array of legal challenges that could see history repeated. At the center of the controversy is an Election Commission (EC) investigation into Thaksin’s influence over the government. The EC is expected to conclude its investigation and forward its findings to the Constitutional Court by the first quarter of 2025. The investigation carries significant consequences for Pheu Thai, including a possible dissolution of the party and decade-long political bans for key executives.
Should the courts prevent Paetongtorn from completing her full term, we can expect to see another round of political realignment, thereby prolonging Thailand’s political volatility to the detriment of policymaking and investor confidence. It is likely that the Bhumjaithai Party will emerge as the primary beneficiary should the Pheu Thai government collapse, given their strong presence in the Senate and more moderate stance on reforms —thereby making them more palatable to the conservative establishment. There have been indications of a rift growing between Pheu Thai and Bhumjaithai, including news reports of the absence of key Bhumjaithai politicians during a cabinet meeting on December 11, 2024, when two crucial executive decrees were tabled. At present, the possibility of Bhumjaithai leader Anutin Charnvirakul emerging as the successor to Paetongtorn appears as a possibility.
In response to these threats to their position, Pheu Thai may reach out to the opposition People’s Party (PP) again. PP is the reincarnation of the Move Forward Party, which was disbanded by the Constitutional Court in August 2024 after being found guilty of treason for advocating reform of Thailand’s strict lese-majeste laws. An alliance with PP may provide Pheu Thai with leverage.
Kickstarting a Sluggish Economy
Alongside their efforts in consolidating their position, the Pheu Thai government also intends to focus on kickstarting Thailand’s sluggish economy. Overall growth in 2024 has been estimated at 2.7%, lower than the early-year forecast of 3% to 4%. This has been attributed to the government’s flagship digital wallet scheme not proceeding as planned (turning instead into a simple cash handout), delayed fiscal spending earlier in the year, and tight monetary policy by the Bank of Thailand. [3]
At present, Paetongtarn’s government seems committed to continuing with the economic policies pursued under Srettha, including cash handouts, a three-year debt suspension for farmers, and attracting foreign investments. The government is also committed to boosting tourism, with a record 40 million arrivals expected to arrive this year. Thailand’s marriage equality legislation, which came into law on January 24, is expected to reinforce the country’s position as a global leader in LGBTQ inclusivity, thereby making it more appealing as an international tourism destination. [4]
Trump to Impact Thai Exports
Thailand’s exports are not expected to grow next year, in part due to the planned tariff policies of the second Trump presidency. In 2023, Thailand exported over USD 48 billion to the United States, accounting for approximately 17% of total export value. Thailand’s trade surplus of USD 29 billion may make it a direct target of the Trump administration, although it is not a particularly large surplus relative to other countries. Even without direct tariffs, Thailand could face non-tariff barriers such as intellectual property protection and enforcement issues, currency manipulator accusations, and US pressure to open the market for US goods such as pork imports. A slowing global economy is also expected to impact Thai exports. As such, the Thai economy will continue to depend on private consumption and tourism as the primary drivers of growth in 2025. [5]
Indonesia
Year of Elections
2024 was a significant year for politics in Indonesia as the country held both its presidential and legislative elections in February and its regional elections in late November last year. Former army general and then-Minister of Defense Prabowo Subianto was voted in as Indonesia’s eighth president in February, securing 58.6% of the vote (totaling 96.2 million votes). Prabowo was able to consolidate his position in the regional elections held on 27 November, with candidates backed by his Onward Indonesia Coalition sweeping most seats (save for Jakarta). Securing control of local governments will be important for Prabowo in realizing his policy ambitions, given Indonesia’s heavily decentralized nature.
Institutional Erosion and Civil Unrest
Both elections took place amidst an erosion of Indonesian institutions and democratic health, courting public controversy and even civil unrest at times. Prabowo’s victory in February owed in part to a controversial Constitutional Court decision in October 2023 which relaxed the age limits for candidates to run in the upcoming presidential election. At the time, the Constitutional Court was chaired by the brother-in-law of former president Joko Widodo (Jokowi). It did not escape the popular imagination that this was a maneuver to allow Jokowi’s then-36-year-old son Gibran to run for vice president as a running mate of Prabowo.
In August 2024, the Constitutional Court handed down two rulings which would have significant impact on the upcoming regional elections in November. The first of these rulings clarified the eligible age of candidates contesting governor or deputy governor posts, thereby blocking Jokowi’s other 29-year-old son Kaesang Pangarep from taking part in any of the local elections. The other ruling lowered the threshold for parties nominating candidates for regional elections, enabling more local elections in November to be competitive. Indonesia’s parliament attempted to rush through changes to electoral laws that would reverse the court’s decisions. In response, a series of student-led rallies demonstrating against the proposed electoral law changes were held in Jakarta and other cities on 22-23 August, with some turning violent. Indonesia’s parliament seemingly backed down in response, withdrawing its planned changes to the electoral laws (albeit likely temporarily).
With the elections out of the way, Indonesia is expected to see more political stability entering 2025. However, negative sentiments surrounding Jokowi’s seeming attempts at building a family political dynasty as well as Prabowo’s own attempts at preventing the formation of an effective opposition may linger throughout 2025, creating the potential for future civil unrest. Controversial remarks made by Prabowo in December suggesting that regional elections be scrapped altogether may spark a significant backlash if followed through.
Overambitious Economic Goals
During his presidential campaign, Prabowo positioned himself as the ‘continuity’ candidate, promising a continuation of Jokowi’s developmental policies. This was indicated in Prabowo’s choice of cabinet unveiled during his inauguration on October 20, 2024, which included 17 ministers from Jokowi’s previous cabinet. This included former Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati and chief economic minister Airlangga Hartarto. By retaining Sri Mulyani, Prabowo seems keen to maintain the confidence of foreign investors.
It should be noted that Prabowo’s cabinet is the country’s largest since the 1960s, with 48 ministers and 58 vice-ministers compared to 34 ministers and 30 vice-ministers under Jokowi. Such a large cabinet is largely seen as Prabowo doling out ministerial positions to bolster political support. Concerns have been raised that such a bloated cabinet may raise administrative costs and slow decision-making processes at a time when institutional reforms should be prioritized.
Without moves towards institutional efficiency, Prabowo may struggle to achieve his goal of 8% annual economic growth during his first term (as part of a larger goal of Indonesia reaching high-income status by 2045). Economists also point to Indonesia’s precarious fiscal position. According to Fithra Faisal, lecturer at the Faculty of Economics and Business at the University of Indonesia, Indonesia’s deficit could widen from 1.65% of GDP in 2024 to at least 2.9% of GDP. This has been attributed in part to Indonesia’s dwindling middle class, leading to declining tax revenues. According to Indonesia’s Bureau of Statistics (BPS), the proportion of the population defined as middle class fell from 23% in 2018 to just 17% in 2023. [6]
Investors also worry that Prabowo’s more extravagant spending plans may add to Indonesia’s fiscal woes. A flagship free school lunch program, for example, is expected to amount to 2% of GDP alone. Investor confidence in Indonesia stumbled somewhat when the Financial Times suggested that to fund Prabowo’s policies, the current debt-to-GDP ratio may be raised from its current levels of 40% to 50%. In response to a subsequent depreciation of the rupiah against the dollar, Prabowo and his economic team have committed to the existing debt caps, at least in the short term. [7]
The Philippines
Dissolution of the UniTeam
Last year saw the dissolution of the so-called ‘UniTeam’ comprising President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and Vice-President Sara Duterte, both of whom had been able to secure a landslide victory during the Philippines’ general elections in May 2022 by consolidating their forces. With both individuals having fallen out, Filipino politics is now dominated by the intense rivalry between the powerful Duterte and Marcos clans, much to the detriment of the country’s political stability and policy regularity. Relations between the two had started to deteriorate in late 2023 over disagreements concerning policy, the Marcos Jr. administration’s foreign policy shift towards the US, investigations into former president (and father of Sara) Rodrigo Duterte’s controversial War on Drugs, and scandals implicating associates of the Dutertes.
After Sara Duterte resigned from her position of Education Secretary and subsequently from the cabinet in July 2024, she faced a congressional probe related to her alleged misuse of confidential intelligence funds. Sara Duterte courted further controversy in late November when she stated she had ordered a hit against Marcos Jr. that was to be carried out if she were to be killed.
As of the time of writing, Sara Duterte faces three impeachment complaints relating to her apparent misuse of over USD 10 million in confidential intelligence funds. These complaints were lodged by civic activists, priests, and lawyers. She also faces a possible fourth impeachment complaint. Should the House endorse the verified complaints, Duterte would be considered ‘impeached’ and the Senate would have to subsequently judge the complaint. It is uncertain whether Marcos will be able to muster the numbers in the Senate to impeach Duterte, with the president having previously suggested that impeachment proceedings would be a ‘waste of time’. Analysts have suggested, however, that delaying impeachment proceedings until after the midterm elections in May 2025 would doom such efforts from the start, as Marcos Jr. would then be seen as a lame-duck president.
All Eyes on the Midterms
The clash between the Dutertes and the Marcos clans will no doubt dominate the upcoming midterm elections in May 2025. The midterms will see 317 seats in the House and thousands of regional and city posts up for grabs among 18,000 total positions. More importantly, 12 seats in the powerful 24-seat Senate will be contested. The campaign period for the midterms officially begins on February 11, with an estimated 70 million citizens eligible to vote.
If the majority of those endorsed by Marcos Jr. win in the Senate and the House, this will ensure his legislative agenda will be able to be pushed through and will provide him with enough legitimacy to anoint his successor for the 2028 presidential election (Filipino presidents are limited to a single six-year term). Marcos Jr. benefits from control over the vast machinery of the state, which will grant him control over many legislators.
Although it was initially rumored that Rodrigo Duterte would run in the senate elections, he is instead running for his former position of mayor of Davao in Mindanao. His two sons are running for the House and vice-mayoralty in Davao respectively. This suggests the Dutertes’ are looking to shore up their support base in their southern stronghold of Mindanao. Nevertheless, several supporters of the Dutertes will be running for Senate seats. For the Dutertes, the 2025 midterms will also be crucial in gauging their popularity. For Sara, who has attempted to position herself as the ‘new’ leader of the opposition since breaking away from Marcos Jr., the midterms will serve as an indication of her chances of running for president in 2028. Recent polling has indicated a drop in approval ratings for both Sara and Marcos Jr., although Sara polls higher than the president.
The upcoming midterms will also have ramifications for the country’s foreign policy. While Marcos Jr. has rekindled the Philippines’ relations with the West, the Dutertes are largely seen as pro-China. During Sara’s time as mayor of Davao, she built strong relations with Chinese government officials. In 2018 during her mayoralty, China opened a consulate in Davao. That same year, she also entered into a sister-city agreement with Jinjiang City in Fujian province. It is likely that the Dutertes will leverage support from Beijing-friendly businessmen and politicians, if not direct help from China itself, in the upcoming midterms.
Moderate Growth for 2025
President Marcos Jr.’s economic team expects 2025 growth to be around 6% to 8%, compared to 6% to 6.5% for 2024. Officials have widened their growth projections for 2025 from a previous range of 6.5% to 7.5% in response to uncertainties caused by Trump’s trade policy (namely his tariff plans). [8]
Growth in 2025 is expected to be led by business-friendly structural reforms, services, manufacturing, and infrastructure. The latter in particular has been a big focus in recent years, and investments are expected to continue flowing into major projects under the “Build, Build, Build” initiative introduced under the previous Duterte administration. Big projects such as new roads, bridges, airports, and ports are expected to create jobs and improve transportation across the country. There will also be a stronger focus on ‘green’ infrastructure in 2025. [9]
The digital economy is also expected to continue growing in 2025, with reports from Google Philippines and the National ICT Confederation of the Philippines (NICP) having highlighted the rapid growth of e-commerce and digital platforms in the Philippines. Since the pandemic, some 3.4 million digital jobs have been created, compared to just 1.9 million in non-digital space. However, digitalization has proved a double-edged sword for the Philippines; some fear that AI may replace jobs in the Philippines’ crucial business process outsourcing (BPO) sector, itself a product of digitalization which generates roughly USD 30 billion in export revenue. [10]
On December 30, President Marcos Jr. signed the 2025 budget into law. The budget envisions a 10% increase in government spending to a record PHP 6.33 trillion (USD 109.2 billion). The education sector is now the recipient with the highest allocation with PHP 1.055 trillion, followed by the Public Works Ministry with PHP 1.034 trillion. This marks the first time that the education and infrastructure budget both hit the trillion-peso mark. Historically, government spending contributes around a fifth of the country’s economic growth. [11]
Singapore
Election Year for Singapore
Singapore’s 2025 outlook will be dominated by the upcoming general election, which per constitutional rules must be held by November 23. The most likely period for an election to be held is either in April-May or in September. The ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) will enter the race under the new leadership of Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, who took over from his predecessor Lee Hsien Loong on May 15, 2024. Singapore’s transition to the so-called fourth generation (4G) leadership was completed on December 4, 2024, when Wong was elected secretary-general of the PAP. Wong named his Cabinet in May 2024 with key portfolios largely unchanged.
While the PAP is largely expected to maintain dominance come election time, even a modest swing in support away from the ruling party would be considered significant. Prime Minister Wong stated as much when he warned that Singapore might be saddled with a much weaker government. In November, he warned that the PAP might lose another three or four group representation constituencies (GRCs), which might translate to a loss of four or five ministers.
Indeed, the PAP enters the election following a string of scandals in 2024. The most prominent included Former Transport Minister Subramaniam Iswaran being sentenced to 12 months in prison in October after pleading guilty to accepting valuable gifts from businessmen while assuming public office. Other scandals included an oil spill that occurred on June 14 at Pasir Panjang Terminal that raised concerns over Singapore’s response effectiveness, as well as former prime minister Lee Hsien Loong’s brother Lee Hsien Yang announcing in October that he had been granted asylum in the UK due to what he labelled politically motivated legal actions against his family by the Singapore government. Beyond the scandals, Singaporeans have expressed dissatisfaction with the rising cost of living in the city state.
However, the main opposition party, the Workers’ Party, has also faced its own string of scandals. The Secretary-General of the Workers’ Party and current opposition leader, Pritam Singh, faces two charges that he lied to parliament. A verdict is expected on February 17 this year. Beyond that, Singaporean news outlets have reported that horse-trading between the different opposition groups have begun in order to avoid any vote splitting in the elections.
Slower Growth in 2025
Singapore is expected to face slower growth in 2025, due in part to its key trading partners expected to face the same issues. The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) forecast real GDP growth in 2025 will range from 1% to 3%. This is less than the 4% 2024 GDP growth estimate given by Prime Minister Wong in his December 31 New Year speech. The tariff plans of the incoming Trump administration are expected to impact Singapore, with MTI projecting that Singapore’s GDP growth could be reduced by at least 1% in the event of a full-scale retaliatory tariff escalation among the world’s three major economies of the US, China and the European Union. Singapore is also susceptible to the current slowdown in China’s economy. However, a potential upswing in the global tech cycle (fueled primarily by the increased global adoption of AI) may support growth. [12] [12]
All eyes will be on the upcoming 2025 budget to be announced on February 18. An election budget, it is expected to prioritize areas such as job security and cost of living. Prime Minister Wong had previously announced that the 2025 Budget would look to support Singaporeans across different life stages. This includes the ‘sandwiched group’ – people with both children and ageing parents – as well as those entering the workforce or starting families. The budget will also look to help citizens upskill and secure better incomes.
About the Southeast Asia Public Policy Institute
The Southeast Asia Public Policy Institute is a research institute based in Bangkok and Singapore, working across the region. Our mission is to support the development of solutions to the most pressing public policy challenges facing Southeast Asia in the 21st century. The Institute undertakes in-depth research to develop actionable policy solutions on a range of issues across sustainability, technology, public health, trade, and governance. We convene dialogues with stakeholders and decisionmakers to drive discussion on the challenges and opportunities facing markets across the region. The Institute draws on a network of in-market researchers, advisors, and partners to provide insights and recommendations for governments, policymakers, and businesses.
[1] Ministry of Finance, Malaysia, “Full Budget 2025 speech,” The Edge, October 20, 2024, https://theedgemalaysia.com/node/730839.
[2] Ibid
[3] Piyasak Manason, “Slow growth, more uncertainty ahead in 2025,” The Bangkok Post, December 28, 2024, https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/general/2928766/slow-growth-more-uncertainty-ahead-in-2025.
[4] Tommy Walker, “Thailand’s economy, tourism remain focus for 2025 under younger Shinawatra,” Voice of America, December 31, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/thailand-s-economy-and-tourism-remain-focus-for-2025-under-younger-shinawatra-/7919623.html.
[5] Deloitte, “2025 Thailand’s Economic Outlook: Risks and Opportunities for Businesses,” Kaohoon International, January 1, 2025, https://www.kaohooninternational.com/uncategorized/550215.
[6] Resty Woro Yuniar, “How Prabowo’s cabinet choices could affect Indonesia’s growth targets, economy,” South China Morning Post, October 23, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/economics/article/3283567/how-prabowos-cabinet-choices-could-affect-indonesias-growth-targets-economy.
[7] Fumito Akiyama, “Prabowo’s economic policy eases deficit concerns in Indonesia,” Nikkei Asia, October 22, 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Prabowo-s-economic-policy-eases-deficit-concerns-in-Indonesia.
[8] Cliff Harvey Venzon and Ditas B Lopez, “Philippines Tweaks 2025 Growth Outlook on Trump’s Tariff Threat,” Bloomberg, December 2, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-12-02/philippines-tweaks-2025-growth-outlook-on-trump-s-tariff-threat?sref=0EQIt3GS.
[9] Joefel Ortega Banzon, “Key trends shaping the Phl economy in 2025,” Philstar, January 1, 2025, https://www.philstar.com/the-freeman/cebu-business/2025/01/01/2410946/key-trends-shaping-phl-economy-2025/amp/.
[10] Banzon, “Key trends shaping the Phl economy in 2025,” Aris Dacanay, “The Philippines has built a solid runway for economic takeoff,” Nikkei Asia, December 10, 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/The-Philippines-has-built-a-solid-runway-for-economic-takeoff.
[11] Mikhail Flores, “Philippines’ Marcos signs into law record $109 bln budget for 2025,” Reuters, December 30, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-marcos-signs-into-law-record-109-bln-budget-2025-2024-12-30/.
[12] Ovais Subhani, “Economic trends to watch for Singapore in 2025,” The Straits Times, January 1, 2025, https://www.straitstimes.com/business/economic-trends-to-watch-for-singapore-in-2025,
[13] Abigail Ng, “Upswing in global tech cycle to support Singapore’s economic growth in 2025: MAS,” CNA, October 28, 2024, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/mas-economy-inflation-tech-cycle-growth-4706521.
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