Southeast Asia Global Relations Outlook Part 5: Longstanding and Rising Alternative Partners
In this final installment of our series analyzing Southeast Asia’s Global Relations Outlook for 2025, we discuss the relationship of ASEAN countries with its longstanding regional partners as well as emerging alternative groupings that aim to challenge the traditional Western rule-based order amid shifting geopolitical dynamics.
Japan
Uncertain Foreign Policy
Japanese foreign policy vis-à-vis ASEAN will see added uncertainty this year amid domestic political instability. Shigeru Ishiba succeeded Fumio Kishida as Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) chief and prime minister following snap elections in October 2024, which also saw the coalition comprising the LDP and Komeito losing its majority to the Lower House for the first time since 2012. The loss of his majority will complicate Ishiba’s decision-making process, hindering the prime minister’s ability to maintain a consistent long-term foreign policy. To illustrate, Ishiba must now negotiate with opposition parties to secure the necessary budget to fulfill commitments made to ASEAN in the 2023 Commemorative Summit for the 50th year of ASEAN-Japan Friendship. During the summit, Japan and ASEAN agreed to strengthen ties in various areas including maritime security, supply chains, sustainable energy, and people-to-people exchanges. Meanwhile, much of the Ishiba administration’s focus in 2025 will be on the upcoming Upper House elections scheduled for July.
Nevertheless, Japan-ASEAN ties are expected to remain stable, anchored in Japan’s high level of credibility and trustworthiness in the region.1 Between 50% to 70% of Southeast Asians said they believe Japan would “do the right thing” for international peace and prosperity. In comparison, the numbers for the US fluctuated between 30% to 50%, while China remained steady at 20% to 30%. For many ASEAN respondents, Japan remains one of the top choices for a third-party actor in the midst of the US-China rivalry, behind the EU.
The high level of regional trust in Japan is partly predicated on the long history of socio-economic cooperation between the country and Southeast Asia, especially through economic assistance in the form of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Between 2015 and 2021, Japan was Southeast Asia’s largest ODA provider with a 31.4% share of total ODA inflows.2 This assistance has aided the development of Southeast Asian countries in infrastructure and technical development as well as healthcare.
Security Partnerships
Japan has increasingly emerged as a major security partner for ASEAN. In April 2023, the country introduced the Official Security Assistance (OSA) to complement ODA by bolstering the defense capabilities of Japan’s Southeast Asian partners. The OSA has enabled Japan to provide defense equipment and security-related financial assistance to partner countries. In ASEAN, much of Japan’s security cooperation focuses on maritime security, given that ASEAN straddles much of the sea lanes vital for Japan’s food and energy security.
The strategic importance Japan assigns to ASEAN can be shown by Ishiba’s choice of Malaysia and Indonesia as his first diplomatic overseas visit since taking office in October 2024 –aside from participating in international conferences in a multilateral setting. Interestingly, Ishiba is Japan’s fourth consecutive prime minister to choose an ASEAN nation for the first foreign visit outside of an international conference. Both visits to Malaysia and Indonesia focused on strengthening maritime security cooperation and advancing economic cooperation. During his visit to Indonesia, Ishiba pledged the provision of high-speed patrol boats to the Indonesian navy as part of the OSA initiative. Both countries also discussed the joint development of vessels based on Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyers. Additionally, both agreed to hold a so-called two-plus-two meeting of foreign and defense ministers by end-2025, their first since March 2021. In the case of Malaysia, Ishiba likewise promised to provide support via the OSA in the form of warning and surveillance systems.
India
Decade of ‘Act East’ Policy
ASEAN remains a vital component of India’s ‘Act East’ policy towards the Indo-Pacific. Introduced in 2014, ‘Act East’ builds upon India’s previous ‘Look East’ policy, in acknowledgment of the need for a more proactive role in the region. In October 2024, India and ASEAN commemorated a decade of India’s ‘Act East’ policy at the 21st ASEAN-India Summit in Vientiane, Laos. Focusing on “Enhancing Connectivity and Resilience,” Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi unveiled a ten-point plan to strengthen cooperation between India and Southeast Asian countries.
Additionally, 2024 saw several engagements between India and ASEAN officials, underscoring the importance of the regional bloc to New Delhi’s regional calculus. In February 2024, ASEAN Secretary-General Dr. Kao Kim Hourn visited India to advance the ASEAN-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) and promote ASEAN diplomacy in India. In March, Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar made trips to the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore, while Modi would make bilateral trips to Brunei Darussalam and Singapore later in September 2024. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh also paid state visits to India last year.
Economic Relationship Marginal
Despite the frequency of engagements with ASEAN, India remains a relatively marginal player in Southeast Asia compared to other regional powers. For one, economic ties between India and ASEAN remain moderate, with ASEAN representing about 11 percent of India’s global trade, a value surpassing USD 100 billion in 2023.3 Compared to other ASEAN Plus FTAs, the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) has the lowest level of trade liberalization and the most restrictive rules of origin requirements. AITIGA is currently under review, with the next round of talks taking place in February 2025. This review is in response to concerns raised by India’s political class regarding India’s trade deficit with ASEAN, which they have attributed to unfair trade practices. Ultimately, protectionist sentiments in India will no doubt create challenges to fostering further economic cooperation between the country and ASEAN.
Credible Alternative Partner
Meanwhile, many have identified India as a credible alternative strategic partner for ASEAN amidst US-China tensions. A survey published by the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute revealed that Southeast Asians ranked India third behind the European Union and Japan as viable partners in broadening ASEAN’s strategic options.4 In the last few years, India has been quietly expanding defense ties with the region. Most notably, India-Philippines security and strategic ties have progressed well. In April 2024, the first batch of the Indian-made anti-ship variant of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile was delivered to the Philippines. During Jaishankar’s visit to the Philippines in March, he also offered to supply the Indian-made Tejas Mark 1 fighter jet to Manila. During his visit, Jaishankar vocally backed the Philippines with regards to the South China Sea dispute.
South Korea
Korea-ASEAN Solidarity Initiative (KASI)
In October 2024, South Korea and ASEAN elevated their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP) during the 25th ASEAN-Republic of Korea (ROK) Summit in Vientiane, Laos, held alongside the 44th ASEAN Summit. The CSP aims to further enhance the decades-long cooperation between South Korea and ASEAN across several sectors, including politics, defense, economics, and future-oriented environmental issues. Former South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol declared that Seoul will double the size of its cooperation funds allocated to ASEAN to USD 48 million by 2027, aimed at supporting key regional projects.
South Korea’s engagement with ASEAN under the former Yoon administration was informed by the Korea-ASEAN Solidarity Initiative (KASI), which had been introduced by Yoon upon taking office in May 2022 to supplant the New Southern Policy (NSP). The NSP had been introduced under Yoon’s predecessor President Moon Jae-In, and had sought the goal of elevating Korea-ASEAN ties “to the level of major powers”. KASI, on the other hand, is largely seen as a downgrade in Korea-ASEAN relations, with the regional bloc now seen as merely a subset of Seoul’s larger Indo-Pacific strategy. While Moon became the first South Korean President to visit all ten ASEAN Member States, Yoon spread his attention between the bloc and other traditional partners for South Korea such as the United States, Japan, and Europe.
Given Yoon’s recent impeachment and arrest following his failed declaration of martial law in December and the political instability that followed, it is unclear how South Korea’s relationship with ASEAN will evolve moving into 2025. However, ASEAN is more than likely expected to remain a priority partner for South Korea given its regional significance.
Economic Ties Remain Crucial
KASI has been described as more security-focused than the NSP, which was criticized as focusing too heavily on economic and development cooperation. However, the bedrock of South Korea-ASEAN relations remains economic ties. ASEAN is South Korea’s second-largest trading partner as well as a top three export market. South Korean outbound shipments to ASEAN reached USD 84.6 billion by September 2024, a 6.6% year-on-year increase.5 Around 5,500 Korean companies also operate in ASEAN.
Furthermore, ASEAN is South Korea’s second largest investment destination, with foreign direct investment (FDI) from South Korea reaching 10.8 billion USD in 2022, and 7.31 billion in 2023 respectively.6 Seoul also sustained an annual average of USD 500 to USD 600 million in official development assistance (ODA) to the region between 2015 and 2021.
Shift to Security
In October 2024, Yoon made several pledges to support regional security while visiting the Philippines, Singapore, and Laos (the latter of which was to attend the ASEAN Summit). Yoon had promised to support Manila’s military modernization program, and also pledged Seoul’s active participation in multilateral drills involving ASEAN countries. Yoon additionally affirmed the importance of maritime security and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. However, despite Yoon’s stated intention of increasing security cooperation with ASEAN, some argue that this was more rhetoric than reality. The absolute number of major conventional weapons transferred to Southeast Asian countries had declined from about 400 under the NSP era to merely 19 in 2022. This decline has been attributed to the fact that Korean arms transfers in the first two years of the Yoon administration had been spread globally rather than focused on Southeast Asia alone. In some sense this was expected, given the more globalist approach of the Yoon administration. Indeed, the share of arms transferred to Southeast Asia dropped to only 9.1% in 2022 from an average of about 50% of Seoul’s total arms transfers under the previous Moon administration.
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
As this year’s ASEAN Chair, Malaysia will be hosting the ASEAN-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-China Summit. The GCC comprises Saudi Arabia, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait. The ASEAN-GCC-China Summit builds upon the inaugural ASEAN-GCC Summit held in October 2023 in Riyadh, which at the time was the highest level of engagement between both regional blocs since relations were first established in 1990. On the occasion of the first summit, both regional blocs outlined their five-year agenda (the Framework of Cooperation 2024-2028) and agreed to hold a biennial summit alternating between the GCC and ASEAN. The upcoming summit in Malaysia is part of that agreement.
According to Malaysian Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan, the ASEAN-GCC-China Summit is expected to form an ‘influential trilateral alliance’ that will unlock significant potential for cooperation across sectors. Mohamad Hasan noted that each party to the Summit brings their own unique strengths that can be leveraged. He notes that while the GCC possesses significant capital, ASEAN has the natural resources and significant development potential. Meanwhile, China boasts a huge market. Furthermore, uncertainties over the policies of the second Trump presidency provides further impetus for each bloc to expand coordination with alternative partners and markets as a form of hedging.
Indeed, during the first ASEAN-GCC Summit, Malaysia under its current prime minister Anwar Ibrahim proposed for negotiations to begin for an ASEAN-GCC FTA. However, there has been no indication of when negotiations are expected to commence. Beyond economic ties, both regional blocs intend to explore collaboration in the areas of maritime security, anti-terrorism and cybersecurity, and climate change and climate security.
BRICS
On January 7 this year, Indonesia became the first Southeast Asian member to join the BRICS+ grouping. Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam have also been recognized as BRICS partner countries. The original organization, BRICS, had been initially founded by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. It later expanded to become BRICS+ after accepting Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates in 2024. BRICS was created as an alternative bloc that seeks to further cooperation between developing countries and the Global South, and is increasingly an attractive option for countries looking to operate beyond the Western-led, so-called rules-based order.
The recent interest expressed by ASEAN Member States in BRICS have raised consternations in the West given the supposed anti-Western stance of the organization. However, it should be noted that for said Southeast Asian states, joining or aligning with BRICS is about expanding their strategic maneuverability through new multilateral forums. Concerns about a deficit in US commitment and economic leadership in the Indo-Pacific under the second Trump presidency, as well as the potential for the new administration to weaponize economic power through tariffs, factors into why ASEAN countries may be increasingly aligning with BRICS. As well, it is hoped that BRICS+ can provide access to newer markets as well as an alternative source of funding for infrastructure development, particularly funding from BRICS’ New Development Bank (NDB). It should also be noted that Indonesia and Thailand are simultaneously seeking membership of the OECD, indicative of their desire to safeguard their neutrality towards both the West and the Global South.
Nevertheless, alignment with BRICS brings its own risks. Recent threats by Trump to impose massive tariffs on BRICS if they attempt to challenge the global dominance of the US Dollar may raise alarm bells among ASEAN leaders fearing US trade retaliation. It is also debatable how much tangible economic advantages BRICS+ can realistically bring to its members and partners. Intra-BRICS trade and investment remains relatively low, with most members reliant on trade and investment with developed economies instead. With Southeast Asian countries having already established regional trade agreements with major partners like China and India – such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and ASEAN+1 – it remains to be seen what additional economic gains BRICS+ can bring.
- According to surveys by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, since 2019 Japan has been consistently regarded as the most trustworthy state among major regional actors, which include China, the EU, India, and the United States. ↩︎
- “Two-way exchanges are crucial for deepening ASEAN–Japan relations,” East Asia Forum, September 4, 2024. https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/09/04/two-way-exchanges-are-crucial-for-deepening-asean-japan-relations/. ↩︎
- “4th Meeting of ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement Joint Committee,” Ministry of Commerce and Industry India, May 12, 2024. https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2020351#:~ ↩︎
- Seah, S. et al., The State of Southeast Asia: 2024 Survey Report, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2024. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/The-State-of-SEA-2024.pdf ↩︎
- Park, Anna, “S. Korea, ASEAN start new era of comprehensive strategic partnership, ” The Korea Times, October 10, 2024. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2025/01/113_383972.html#:~ ↩︎
- “Overview: ASEAN,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/wpge/m_5466/contents.do ↩︎
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